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1 Introduction
Strategic trade policy, which combines international trade theory and industrial organization, has been
brought to our attention due the seminal work by Brander and Spencer (1985). Through these policies,
governments influence the behavior of their domestic firms in their subsequent strategic interaction with
foreign firms. Strategic trade policy is designed to shift profits towards domestic firms when market in
the destination country is imperfectly competitive. Brander and Spencer (1985) show that an export
subsidy can shift rents from the foreign to the domestic firm, hence provides a new explanation for the
use of export subsidies. Moreover, Krishna (1989) shows that direct quantity constraints on exports
can perform a similar role in oligopolistic markets under certain conditions.
A weakness of these results is that these theoretical models constrain the policy instrument selected
by governments. For instance, Brander and Spencer (1985) restrict their attention to export subsidy
or tax. Another shortcoming of conventional strategic trade policy models is that they assume that
governments have complete information about export markets. However, real policymakers are unlikely
to meet the information requirements assumed by theorists. Cooper and Riezman (1989) is the first
paper to introduce uncertainty and incomplete information in the context of strategic trade policy.1
In Cooper-Riezman three-country trade model à la Brander and Spencer (1985), policymakers can
use either price incentives (export subsidies) or direct quantity controls (export quotas), but they
are not fully informed about demand in the export market. Cooper and Riezman (1989) argue that
governments will subsidize domestic firms when the degree of export market uncertainty is high and
export quotas when uncertainty is low. In addition, they show that the number of firms plays a critical
role in equilibrium. Countries with a large number of firms will tax, while countries with fewer firms
will subsidize exports in a bilateral subsidy game.
The role of uncertainty in strategic trade policy models have been examined in other contexts as
well. Shivakumar (1993) analyzes the importance of demand uncertainty for the optimal choice of
trade policy instrument as inCooper and Riezman (1989). However, Shivakumar (1993)’s focus is the
timing of policy implementation, the choice being whether to do it before or after the resolution of
uncertainty. Grant and Quiggin (1997) show that whether the equilibrium modes of trade intervention
in the presence of uncertainty is a specific, ad valorem or quadratic trade tax, emerges endogenously
1Ning (2020a) introduces incomplete information at industrial level in examining social welfare equivalence issue of
tariff and quota from the importing country’s perspective. He shows that a tariff is always superior to a quota as long as
incomplete information persists at industrial level. Moreover, Ning (2020b) also introduces incomplete information into
reciprocal dumping model, and he shows that the equilibrium outcome from choosing between tariff and subsidy results
a prisoner dilemma outcome.
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from the parameters of the model. He uses an equilibrium concept using supply functions proposed by
Klemperer and Meyer (1989). Caglayan (2000) extends Cooper and Riezman (1989) framework to the
to the context where firms from both countries have imperfect information about uncertain demand
in the third country but receive a signal about the stochastic term. Although, in this case, firms have
imperfect information about demand in the destination country, the signal firms received equips them
with better information than policymakers.
In addition to the choice of trade policy instruments under uncertainty, which is the main focus of
the previous papers, specific policy instrument and information asymmetry have also been considered
in the context of strategic trade policy. Qui (1994) compares the impact of complete information and
incomplete information on export subsidies in a model where only one government is active, and the
cost of a firm is unknown to both government and the rival firm. For Cournot competition, he finds
the government prefers to be informed and thus offers complete-information subsidies. Maggi (1999)
examines equilibrium trade policies when firms have better information than governments about the
profitability of the industry. The main result is that, governments offer non-linear export subsidies
inducing firms to reveal information. The firms respond by expanding outputs, thereby adding to the
Brander–Spencer prisoner’s dilemma problem. Similarly, Creane and Miyagiwa (2008) study an infor-
mation acquisition model in which firms have incentive to disclose information to the governments in
a three-country trade model. They prove that firms disclose demand and cost information to govern-
ments in a Cournot competition, and governments are caught in an informational prisoner’s dilemma.
Anam and Chiang (2000) extend Brander and Spencer (1985) single export market framework with
demand uncertainty to the context of multiple correlated export markets. They demonstrate that when
firms engage in quantity competition in two stochastic and positively correlated markets, it may be
optimal to tax exports to the more volatile market while subsidizing it in the relatively stable market
when firms are risk-averse.
The current paper investigates the effect of incomplete information at industrial level on choice of
trade policies. We model a three-country international trade model à la Brander and Spencer (1985)
with demand uncertainty in the third country, which is the destination of the other two country’s
exports. Similar to Cooper and Riezman (1989), we focus on the choice of trade policy, assuming
governments from exporting countries have no information about demand condition in the destination
country. Unlike Cooper and Riezman (1989), we assume that one of the exporting firms has an
information advantage over the other. Specifically, we let firm from one of the exporting country
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have complete information about demand in the third country, while firm from the other country is
assumed to be incompletely informed. Our equilibrium results are significantly different from Cooper
and Riezman (1989) and Caglayan (2000). We show that direct quantity control becomes the dominant
strategy for country with the incompletely-informed firm. By contrast, the equilibrium choice between
export subsidy and export quota for the country with the fully informed firm depends on the degree
of uncertainty in the third market. We demonstrate that what drives our results is the option value
associated with the ability to make decisions armed with more information about the uncertainty
parameters. This paper is organized as follows: section 2 outlines the basic third-market model and
information partition. Section 3 derives sub game equilibrium for various pairs of strategies. Section 4
characterizes and analyzes the optimal choice of policy regimes. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Following Brander and Spencer (1985), we assume that there are two firms, one domestic (denote as
firm 1) and one foreign (denote as firm 2), producing a homogeneous product exclusively for exports.2
The export competition takes place in a neutral third country where the demand is subject to some
random disturbances. For simplicity, assume that the inverse demand function in this export market
is
p = a− b (q1 + q2) + ε,
where q1 and q2 represent the export of the domestic and foreign firms respectively. The parameters
a and b are both positive and ε is a random variable, defined over a finite set Ω, which reflects
stochastic demand conditions. For tractability, it is assumed that the disturbance term ε is binary,
which takes only two possible values: ε ∈ Ω = {εl, εh}, where εh > εl. The subjective common prior
for εl and εh to occur are θ and 1 − θ, respectively. Hence the expected value of random variable is
E(ε) = θεl + (1− θ)εh, and the variance of random variable is var (ε) = E
(
ε2
)
− E (ε)
2
= σ2.
The cost of production for firm i (i = 1, 2) is assumed to be linear in output, i.e.,
Ci = cqi.
Following Cooper and Riezman (1989), our model consists of three stages. In stage one, each
2Our model is readily to be extended to have N1 number of firms in the domestic country and N2 number of firms
in the foreign country as in Cooper and Riezman (1989).
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government commits to a policy instrument before the realization of random variable ε. The levels of
the policy instruments are then set in the second stage, again before the realization of ε. The values
of ε becomes known at the beginning of stage three. Unlike the Cooper-Riezman’s model, we assume
that ε is fully observable to the foreign firm, but such information is not available to the home firm.
However, the home firm does know the distribution of ε.3 That is, the home firm faces information
disadvantage in competing with the foreign firm in export competition. This permits us to gain some
insights into the effect of incomplete information on policy choices by each country. Both firms play a
Cournot-Nash game and set outputs to maximize profits under incomplete information in stage three,
given optimal policies chosen by the governments in previous stages. Since the foreign firm sets output
after observing realized market demand, it stands to capture the option value associated with being
able to wait for the resolution of uncertainty. Figure 1 shows the time of moves and the (partial)
resolution of uncertainty.
Figure 1: Three-stage trade game with incomplete information
Stage 1 Stage 2 Beginning of Stage 3 Stage 3
Governments Governments Trade policies and levels Firms
select → select → are revealed to firms, → select
policy forms policy levels and firm 2 realizes ε. quantities
Before getting into the heart of present model, it may be useful to consider the case where there
is no government interventions and firms can fully observe the market condition when ε is realized.
Under this limiting case, firm i’s profit is therefore
pii = pqi − cqi,
for i = 1, 2. One can easily verify that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of output is
q∗i =
a− c+ ε
3b
,
for i = 1, 2. For the output to be non-negative, it requires a− c+ ε ≥ 0. This benchmark case serves
as a basis for comparison when the governments seek to shift profits in favor of their native firms by
providing an export subsidy (Brander and Spencer (1985)).
3This is reflected in our common prior assumption.
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In what follows, we construct a three-stage perfect Bayesian equilibria for various policy regimes
using backward induction. Subsidy and quota games are examined in sequence and their welfare
implications are compared. By using this approach, we can guarantee that the equilibrium is a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
3 Equilibrium of Subgames
In this section, we derive equilibrium levels of output produced by firms and levels of government in-
tervention using Bayesian Nash solution concept in each subgame (stage two and stage three). In other
words, we derived the equilibrium points when two governments choose the following four combinations
of forms of intervention:
i. (S, S): both governments grant export subsidy;
ii. (Q,Q): both governments impose export quota;
iii. (Q,S): government 1 imposes export quota while government 2 provides export subsidies;
iv. (S,Q): government 1 grants export subsidy while government 2 imposes export quotas.
Denote qi (a1, a2) as firm i’s decision on output level as a reaction to a pair of strategy in forms of
intervention chosen by both governments, where a1 ∈ A1 = {S,Q} and a2 ∈ A2 = {S,Q}.
4 For each
of the following subsections, expected social welfare for both countries are also derived.
3.1 Bilateral Subsidy Game: (S,S)
We first consider the game, where subsidy is committed to by governments as the instrument of
protection, in stage one. The solution through backward induction starts in stage three when ε
becomes known to firm 2.
The game involves two firms and has two states of nature (εl and εh) that are asymmetrically
revealed to the firms involved. The possible actions of each player are the amount of outputs (or
exports) which is defined over [0,∞). Technically, it is an incomplete information (Bayesian) game.
In what follows, we characterize the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Specifically, each firm maximize its
(expected) profit by setting quantities given conjectures on the quantities chosen by its rival. In a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, these conjectures will be confirmed.
4Ai is the set of actions for government i in the stage one game. We use S stands for export subsidy and Q stands
for export quota.
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Let s1 and s2 be the amount of subsidy given by governments 1 and 2, respectively, to their own
firm. Being unable to observe the true state of nature, firm 1 thus chooses q1(S, S) to maximize the
expected profits, given by
E(pi1(S, S)) = θ
((
a− b
(
q1(S, S) + q
l
2(S, S)
)
+ εl
)
q1(S, S)− cq1(S, S) + s1q1(S, S)
)
+ (1− θ)
((
a− b
(
q1(S, S) + q
h
2 (S, S)
)
+ εh
)
q1(S, S)− cq1(S, S) + s1q1(S, S)
)
, (1)
where θ and 1− θ are the subjective probabilities associated with εl and εh.
On the other hand, firm 2 is able to observe the true state of nature once it is realized. Hence, it
can make its production decision according to the demand condition. If ε = εl, firm 2 chooses q
l
2(S, S)
to maximize its profit:
pil2(S, S) =
(
a− b
(
q1(S, S) + q
l
2(S, S)
)
+ εl
)
ql2(S, S)− cq
l
2(S, S) + s2q
l
2(S, S). (2)
Conversely, if ε = εh, firm 2 sets q
h
2 (S, S) so as to maximize
pih2 (S, S) =
(
a− b
(
q1(S, S) + q
h
2 (S, S)
)
+ εl
)
qh2 (S, S)− cq
h
2 (S, S) + s2q
h
2 (S, S). (3)
The best response functions for the above maximization problems are
BR1(q
l
2, q
h
2 ) = q1 ∈ argmaxE(pi1(S, S)),
BR2l(q1) = q
l
2 ∈ argmaxpi
l
2(S, S),
BR2h(q1) = q
h
2 ∈ argmaxpi
h
2 (S, S).
Given these, we obtain the Bayesian Nash equilibrium points as follows:
q1(S, S) =
a− c+ 2s1 − s2
3b
+
E(ε)
3b
,
ql2(S, S) =
a− c− s1 + 2s2
3b
+
εl
2b
−
E(ε)
6b
, (4)
qh2 (S, S) =
a− c− s1 + 2s2
3b
+
εh
2b
−
E(ε)
6b
.
These equations characterize the Bayesian Nash equilibrium points in market 3 for given values
of (s1, s2, εl, εh, θ). Notice that higher values of s1 leads increasing output by country 1’s firm, while
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higher values of s2 from its rival country causes firm 1’s output to fall. This is due to the fact that
governments recognize increasing export subsidy levels lead to output expansions by their firms and
output reductions by rival firms5.
In stage two, both governments maximize their expected social welfare by choosing export subsidy
levels, and they take into account the responses from firms (incompletely informed) in stage three. That
is, a government’s objective is to choose a value for the ex post subsidy that maximizes the expected
value of its firm’s profit net of subsidies since we can ignore consumer’s surplus due to absence of
domestic consumers. This implies that income distribution is not an important determinant of social
welfare for each country.
Information partition for both countries indicates both countries have no information about true
demand in country 3, and country 1 only anticipates its firm has one reaction function of output level
in the following stage (due to lack of information). We can write expected social welfare for country
1 as
E(SW1(S, S)) = E(pi1(S, S))− s1q1(S, S), (5)
where
E(pi1(S, S)) =
(a− c+ 2s1 − s2 + E(ε))
2
9b
.
On the other hand, country 2 knows its firm will have complete information about true demand
in market 3, then country 2’s expected social welfare given the common prior (θ, 1− θ) on Ω can be
written as
E(SW2(S, S)) = θ
(
pil2(S, S)− s2q
l
2(S, S)
)
+ (1− θ)
(
pih2 (S, S)− s2q
h
2 (S, S)
)
, (6)
where
pil2(S, S) =
(2a− 2c− 2s1 + 4s2 + 3εl − E(ε))
2
36b
,
pih2 (S, S) =
(2a− 2c− 2s1 + 4s2 + 3εh − E(ε))
2
36b
.
Similar to solving Bayesian Nash equilibrium points in the third stage, each country maximize its
expected social welfare by setting export subsidy levels given conjectures on the levels chosen by the
other government in the second stage.
5E.g., traditional view on profit shifting motivation as in Brander and Spencer (1985).
7
The best response functions for stage two game are
BR1(s2) = s1 ∈ argmaxE(SW1(S, S)),
BR2(s1) = s2 ∈ argmaxE(SW2(S, S)).
Solving yields the Bayesian Nash equilibrium level of subsidy rate as
s∗1 = s
∗
2 =
a− c
5
+
E (ε)
5
. (7)
Note that si > 0 for i = 1, 2. That is, both governments choose to subsidize their own firms. It
is worth noting that the equilibrium export subsidy levels are symmetric for both governments even
with incomplete information at industrial level. This is because governments 1 and 2 hold the same
prior beliefs about random variable ε and q1(S, S) = θq
l
2(S, S) + (1 − θ)(q
h
2 (S, S)). Also note that
when E(ε) = 0, the equilibrium export subsidy is reduced the export subsidy obtained by Cooper and
Riezman (1989) even though information symmetry is assumed in their paper.
Substituting equation (7) into the expected social welfare functions for both governments, we get:
E(SW1(S, S)) =
2((a− c) + E(ε))2
25b
, (8)
E(SW2(S, S)) =
2((a− c) + E(ε))2
25b
+
σ2
4b
. (9)
Notice that E(SW2(S, S)) is the sum of firm’s profits net of export subsidy and the variance term
(which is absent in E(SW1(S, S))). This indicates that higher variance of ε benefits the country with
better information (i.e., country 2 in our model). This can be seen by calculating ∂E(SW2(S,S))
∂σ2
= 14b > 0
and E(SW2(S, S)) − E(SW1(S, S)) =
1
4b (σ
2) > 0. Obviously, if there is no uncertainty in demand
(hence no information problem), we obtain the classical result of Brander and Spencer (1985). This
gives us
Proposition 1. Under a bilateral subsidy game, the difference in expected social welfare between two
countries is the option value effect enjoyed by the country with well-informed firm. Moreover, the
expected social welfare for country with better informed firm increases with market volatility.
Having more information at industrial level does not always benefit the foreign firm. This occurs
especially when ε = εl. Specifically, firm 2’s expected profit is lower (higher) than firm 1’s expected
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profit if the true market demand in country 3 is low (high). To see this, calculate
E(pi1(S, S)) =
4(a− c+ E(ε))2
25b
,
E(pil2(S, S)) =
(4a− 4c+ 5εl − E(ε))
2
100b
, (10)
E(pih2 (S, S)) =
(4a− 4c+ 5εh − E(ε))
2
100b
.
It can be easily verified that E
(
pil2 (S, S)
)
< E (pi1 (S, S)) < E
(
pih2 (S, S)
)
. This is because firm 1
with incomplete information always produces the moderate level of output (i.e., a weighted average
output level given (θ, 1− θ) over Ω). Nevertheless, when the true demand is low, firm 2 will be forced
to produce less than expected, given that firm 1 is incapable of reacting to it for lack of information.
Conversely, when the true demand is high, firm 2 will respond by producing much more to take
advantage of good market conditions, given that it anticipates no action from firm 1.
It is also worth noting the differences among E(pil2(S, S)), E(pi1(S, S)) and E(pi
h
2 (S, S)) depend on
the common prior (θ, 1− θ) over Ω. For any fixed parameters, if firm 1 is more pessimistic (i.e., higher
θ), it will lose more profit relative to firm 2 in high demand. But if firm 1 is more optimistic (i.e.,
lower θ), the opposite is true.
3.2 Bilateral Quota Game: (Q,Q)
The equilibrium analysis under bilateral export quota subgame is easy to analyze. In this case, govern-
ments impose export level restrictions for their own firms in the second stage. For simplicity, assume
that export quota levels are binding for both firms in both countries. That is, both firms will produce
positive outputs in stage three, given export restrictions set by their home governments in stage two.
Each government sets an export ceiling to the third market for their respective firms in stage two.
Since the actions taken by both governments occur before the resolution of random variable, each
government chooses qi (Q,Q) for i = 1, 2 so as to maximize their expected social welfare given by
E(pi1(Q,Q)) = θ ((a− b (q1(Q,Q) + q2(Q,Q)) + εl) q1(Q,Q)− cq1(Q,Q))
+ (1− θ) ((a− b (q1(Q,Q) + q2(Q,Q)) + εh) q1(Q,Q)− cq1(Q,Q)) , (11)
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and
E (pi2 (Q,Q)) = θ ((a− b (q2 (Q,Q) + q1 (Q,Q)) + εl) q2 (Q,Q)− cq2 (Q,Q))
+ (1− θ) ((a− b (q2 (Q,Q) + q1 (Q,Q)) + εh) q2 (Q,Q)− cq2 (Q,Q)) , (12)
respectively. The best response functions for above optimization problems are
BR1(q2 (Q,Q)) = q1 (Q,Q) ∈ argmaxE(pi1(Q,Q)),
BR2(q1 (Q,Q)) = q2 (Q,Q) ∈ argmaxE(pi2(Q,Q)).
Solving yields the Bayesian Nash equilibrium level of quota:
q∗1 (Q,Q) = q
∗
2 (Q,Q) =
a− c
3b
+
E (ε)
3b
. (13)
Substituting equation (13) into each firm’s expected profit functions, we obtain the expected social
welfare for both countries as follows:
E (SW1 (Q,Q)) = E (SW2 (Q,Q)) =
((a− c) + E (ε))
2
9b
. (14)
It is worth noting that both government end up with same level of social welfare under export
quota game. In this case, there is no option value to be had for firm 2 even though it has more
information about the market condition than firm 1 does. With output being state-independent under
quota, the well-informed firm looses the option of setting output according to the market conditions
and therefore, there is no option value effect associated with information advantage for firm 2.
Next, we turn to examine equilibrium for mixed games.
3.3 Export Quota v.s. Export Subsidy: (Q,S)
So far we have derived subgame equilibrium when both governments choose symmetric strategies.
We now consider the scenarios that governments 1 and 2 choose to intervene with asymmetric policy
instruments. Suppose that government 1 chooses direct quantity control and government 2 decides to
subsidize its own firm. Under this circumstance, government 1 imposes an output constraint on firm
1, while government 2 selects the amount of subsidy for firm 2 in stage 1. Given our assumption that
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a quota is binding, this limits what firm 1 can sell to the third market. Letting q1 (Q,S) be the quota
imposed on firm 1 by government 1, firm 2’s profits for ε = εh and ε = εl are
pil2 (Q,S) =
(
a− b
(
q1 (Q,S) + q
l
2 (Q,S)
)
+ εl
)
ql2 (Q,S)− cq
l
2 (Q,S) + s2q
l
2 (Q,S) , (15)
pih2 (Q,S) =
(
a− b
(
q1 (Q,S) + q
h
2 (Q,S)
)
+ εl
)
qh2 (Q,S)− cq
h
2 (Q,S) + s2q
h
2 (Q,S) . (16)
Therefore, in stage three, firm 2 chooses ql2 (Q,S) to maximize pi
l
2 (Q,S) and q
h
2 (Q,S) to maximize
pih2 (Q,S).
The best response functions for firm 2’s problems are
BR2l(q1 (Q,S)) = q
l
2 (Q,S) ∈ argmaxpi
l
2 (Q,S) ,
BR2h(q1 (Q,S)) = q
h
2 (Q,S) ∈ argmaxpi
h
2 (Q,S) .
Solving yields
ql2 (Q,S) =
a− c+ s2 − bq1 (Q,S) + εl
2b
, (17)
qh2 (Q,S) =
a− c+ s2 − bq1 (Q,S) + εh
2b
, (18)
given any level of s2.
Given these, government 1 then chooses the export quota level while government 2 selects optimal
subsidy level in stage two. For the third market model, the expected social welfare for country 1 can
therefore be written as
E (SW1 (Q,S)) = θ
((
a− b
(
q1 (Q,S) + q
l
2 (Q,S)
)
+ εl
)
q1 (Q,S)− cq1 (Q,S)
)
+ (1− θ)
((
a− b
(
q1 (Q,S) + q
h
2 (Q,S)
)
+ εh
)
q1 (Q,S)− cq1 (Q,S)
)
. (19)
Similarly, the expected social welfare for country 2 is specified as producer’s surplus net of subsidy,
given by
E (SW2 (Q,S)) = θ
(
pil2 (Q,S)− s2q
l
2 (Q,S)
)
+ (1− θ)
(
pih2 (Q,S)− s2q
l
2 (Q,S)
)
, (20)
11
where
pil2 (Q,S) =
(a− c+ s2 − bq1 (Q,S) + εl)
2
4b
,
pih2 (Q,S) =
(a− c+ s2 − bq1 (Q,S) + εh)
2
4b
.
Government 1 chooses q1 (Q,S) to maximize its expected social welfare, while government 2 chooses
s2 to maximize its expected social welfare simultaneously. The best response functions are
BR1(s2) = q1 (Q,S) ∈ argmaxE (SW1 (Q,S)) ,
BR2(q1 (Q,S)) = s2 ∈ argmaxE (SW2 (Q,S)) .
Solving yields Bayesian Nash equilibrium policy level:
q∗1 (Q,S) =
a− c
2b
+
E (ε)
2b
, (21)
s∗2 = 0. (22)
Hence, the optimal policy for government 2 is not to intervene at all. The reason behind this
result is that firm 2 knows what firm 1 will produce given the quota is binding and it can also fully
observe the true market demand and act accordingly. Profit maximization by firm 1 ensures social
welfare maximization for the entire country. Therefore, there is no role for government 1 to play. This
explains s∗2 = 0.
Substituting s∗2 = 0 into firm 2’s best response function, we get the expected output for firm 2 in
equilibrium:
E(ql2 (Q,S)) =
a− c
4b
+
εl
2b
−
E (ε)
4b
,
E(qh2 (Q,S)) =
a− c
4b
+
εh
2b
−
E (ε)
4b
.
The corresponding social welfare for each country under (Q,S) are
E (SW1 (Q,S)) =
((a− c) + E (ε))
2
8b
, (23)
E (SW2 (Q,S)) =
((a− c) + E (ε))
2
16b
+
var (ε)
4b
. (24)
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Note that the second term in country 2’s social welfare is the option value associated with better
information. It is easy to verify that the expected social welfare for country 2 increases as market
volatility increases. Moreover, it is straightforward to obtain
E (SW2 (Q,S))− E (SW1 (Q,S)) > (<) 0,
if and only if var (ε) > (<) ((a−c)+E(ε))
2
4 . This implies that country 2 is better off (worse off) relative
to country 1 when the degree of uncertainty is sufficiently high (low).
3.4 Export Subsidy VS Export Quota: (S,Q)
Here, we consider the last pair of strategies (S,Q) that are selected by two governments in the first
stage: with government 1 choosing subsidy and government 2 imposing direct quantity control. As
usual, our analysis starts from the last stage. Firm 1 does not know the true market demand in the
third market, but it can however observe the export quota level q2 (S,Q) set by government 2. Firm
1’s expected profit function is
E (pi1 (S,Q)) = θ ((a− b (q1 (S,Q) + q2 (S,Q)) + εl) q1 (S,Q))
+ (1− θ) ((a− b (q1 (S,Q) + q2 (S,Q)) + εh) q1 (S,Q))
− cq1 (S,Q) + s1q1 (S,Q) . (25)
Being unable to observe the realized demand, firm 1 produces a fixed state-independent output
for the third market, given q2 (S,Q). Thus, it chooses q1(S,Q) to maximize its profit and the best
response function is
BR1(q2 (S,Q)) = q1(S,Q) ∈ argmaxE (pi1 (S,Q)) .
Solving yields
q1 (S,Q) =
a− c+ s1 − bq2 (S,Q)
2b
+
E (ε)
2b
,
given any level of s1.
In stage two, government 1 sets the subsidy level s1 to maximize its expected social welfare (specified
as producer’s surplus net of subsidy) given by
E(SW1 (S,Q)) = E (pi1 (S,Q))− s1q1(S,Q), (26)
13
where
E (pi1 (S,Q)) =
(a− c+ s1 + E (ε)− bq2 (S,Q))
2
4b
.
At the same time, government 2 selects the export quota q2 (S,Q) to maximize its social welfare
(specified as producer’s surplus):
E(SW2 (S,Q)) = θ ((a− b (q1(S,Q) + q2 (S,Q)) + εl) q2 (S,Q))
+ (1− θ) ((a− b (q1(S,Q) + q2 (S,Q)) + εh) q2 (S,Q))
− cq2 (S,Q) . (27)
The best response functions for the above optimization problems are
BR1(q2 (S,Q)) = s1 ∈ argmaxE(SW1 (S,Q)),
BR2(s1) = q2 (S,Q) ∈ argmaxE(SW2 (S,Q)).
Solving yields Bayesian Nash equilibrium policy rate:
s∗1 = 0, (28)
q∗2 (S,Q) =
(a− c)
2b
+
E (ε)
2b
. (29)
Surprisingly, the optimal policy regime is symmetric as in (Q,S). Here, government 1 now grants
no subsidy to firm 1 if government 2 imposes an export quota on firm 2. This can be explained as
follows. Government 1 makes its choice based on its conjecture on government 2’s best response; if
there is no deviation from government 2’s actual choice, then the Bayesian Nash equilibrium holds in
stage two. Since government 1 and firm 1 have same information partition over Ω and firm 1 is well
informed about the export quota imposed by government 2 at the beginning of stage three, firm 1
actually knows what firm 2 will produce. In this case, firm 2 loses the option of responding to market
conditions since its output is fixed by the quota and is therefore no longer state contingent. Therefore,
government 1 would leave full decision to its own firm (i.e., firm 1) since profit maximization ensures
social welfare maximization in the third market setting. In short, government 1 would choose no
subsidy.
Substituting stage two equilibrium points into firm 1’s best response function, we get the expected
14
output by firm 1 in stage three:
E(q1 (S,Q)) =
a− c
4b
+
E (ε)
4b
.
The corresponding expected social welfare for both couturiers under (S,Q) are
E (SW1 (S,Q)) =
((a− c) + E (ε))
2
16b
, (30)
E (SW2 (S,Q)) =
((a− c) + E (ε))
2
8b
. (31)
This together with the finding under (Q,Q) imply that the export quota essentially eliminates firm’s
ability to react to market conditions after the resolution of uncertainty. Hence no option value available
for the country with the better-informed firm. This can be seen in E(SW2(Q,Q)) and E(SW2(S,Q))
that have no σ2 term. This gives us
Proposition 2. The export quota eliminates option values for the country with the better-informed
firm.
We are now ready to endogenize the choice of policy regimes in stage one. To this end, a normal
form game is constructed next.
4 Choice of Trade Policy
The equilibrium analysis for each sub-game in the previous section indicates that the form of inter-
vention does not lead to the same welfare outcome. We can now pose the obvious question: what will
the governments choose in stage one when the foreign firm has better information about the market
condition over the domestic firm? We answer this question with the help of normal form game outlined
below.
Let a n-tuple G ≡< N, (Ai) , (SWi) , f, (i) > be a strategic game of choice of trade policy. The
specification of the game G is as follows:
i. the finite set of players N consist of two players: government 1 and 2;
ii. for each government i ∈ N , the set of actions Ai ≡ {Subsidy,Quota};
iii. the set SWi represents the set of expected social welfare for government i;
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iv. a function f : Ai → SWi associates consequences with action profiles;
v. for each government i ∈ N , the preference relation of government i is i over SWi.
6
We introduce a set of expected social welfare SW here because each government cares about its social
welfare, but not about the profiles of export subsidy or export quota level that generate that social
welfare level.
Normal form representation of game G is illustrated in Table 1. Government 1 is the row player
and government 2 is the column player. The first expression in each cell is the expected social welfare
level for country 1 and the second expression in each cell is the expected social welfare level for country
2.
Table 1: Normal form representation of game G
Government 2
Government 1 Subsidy Quota
Subsidy 2((a−c)+E(ε))
2
25b ,
2((a−c)+E(ε))2
25b +
σ2
4b
((a−c)+E(ε))2
16b ,
((a−c)+E(ε))2
8b
Quota ((a−c)+E(ε))
2
8b ,
((a−c)+E(ε))2
16b +
σ2
4b
((a−c)+E(ε))2
9b ,
((a−c)+E(ε))2
9b
In order to illustrate Nash equilibrium of game G, we adopt the rationalizability concept by Pearce
(1984) for presentation purpose. It follows that the game G is dominant solvable. We begin by proving
the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Subsidy is a strictly dominated strategy for government 1.
Proof. Let B1 (a2) be the set of government 1’s best actions
B1 (a2) ≡ {a1 ∈ A1| (a1, a2) 1 (a
′
1, a2) ∀a
′
1 ∈ A1} .
Given government 2 chooses Subsidy, we have
B1 (Subsidy) = {Quota} ,
6For example, an action ai  a
′
i
if and only if f (ai, a−i)  f
(
a′
i
, a−i
)
∀ai, a
′
i
∈ Ai.
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since f (Quota, Subsidy) ≻1 f (Subsidy, Subsidy) or
((a−c)+E(ε))2
8b >
2((a−c)+E(ε))2
25b ;
Similarly, given government 2 chooses Quota, we have
B1 (Quota) = {Quota} ,
since f (Quota,Quota) ≻1 f (Subsidy,Quota) or
((a−c)+E(ε))2
9b >
((a−c)+E(ε))2
16b .
Hence we have
B1 (a2) = {Quota} ∀a2 ∈ A2.
Therefore, the subsidy will never be chosen by government 1. In other words, government 1 will
always prefer to choose the quota irrespective of the policy choice of government 2. In view of subsidy
being a strictly dominated strategy for government 1, government 2 will respond by choosing a quota
(subsidy) if σ2 ≤ (>) 736 ((a− c) + E (ε))
2
. This is proven in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The optimal strategy for government 2 depends on the variance over Ω. Specifically, a
quota (subsidy) is chosen if σ2 ≤ (>) 736 ((a− c) + E (ε))
2
.
Proof. Let B2 (Quota) be the set of government 2’s best responses to government 1’s strategy Quota
B2 (Quota) ≡ {a2 ∈ A2| (Quota, a2) 2 (Quota, a
′
2)} .
If f (Quota,Quota) ≻2 f (Subsidy,Quota), we have
((a−c)+E(ε))2
9b ≥
((a−c)+E(ε))2
16b +
σ2
4b , that is
B2 (Quota) = {Quota} if σ
2 ≤
7
36
((a− c) + E (ε))
2
.
On the other hand, if f (Subsidy,Quota) ≻2 f (Quota,Quota), we have
((a−c)+E(ε))2
16b +
σ2
4b ≥
((a−c)+E(ε))2
9b , that is
B2 (Quota) = {Subsidy} if σ
2 ≥
7
36
((a− c) + E (ε))
2
.
Thus the best response to government 1’s strategy Quota for government 2 depends on σ2.
As we can see, for a small variance, setting Quota becomes the dominant strategy for government
2. Since neither governments has information advantage over each other, there is no option value to
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country 2 and both countries end up having the same expected level of social welfare. On the other
hand, for sufficiently large variance, choosing Subsidy becomes the dominant strategy for government
2. The option value accounts for a significant part of social welfare for country 2. By lemmas 1 and 2,
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Nash equilibrium of game G is
i. (Q,Q) if σ2 ≤ 736 ((a− c) + E (ε))
2
;
ii. (Q,S) if σ2 ≥ 736 ((a− c) + E (ε))
2
.
Our result is in sharp contrast to Cooper and Riezman (1989) and Caglayan (2000). In their
studies, both firms have complete information about demand condition in the third market, and any
of four pairs of strategies can become Nash equilibrium trade policy choice, depending on the market
volatility. Here, we show that Quota becomes the dominant strategy for country with the less informed
firm. Hence the possibility of getting (S, S) and (S,Q) are eliminated. As the flexibility provided by
setting subsidy can only be beneficial to the country with a well-informed firm, incomplete information
itself redistributes the option value from the less-informed to the well-informed country. But the option
value is accrues to the country with a better informed firm only if the variance is sufficiently large.
5 Conclusion
The literature on the choice of strategic trade policy in oligopolistic industry under uncertainty points
to a variety of combinations of modes of intervention that could emerge as an equilibrium outcome in
a three-country setting (see Brander and Spencer (1985)). When we consider policymakers choosing
between export subsidy/tax and export quota, the optimal choice of trade policy depends on the degree
of uncertainty in the third market, and all four combinations of subsidy and quota could be equilibrium
under demand uncertainty. The novelty of this paper is that it analyzes the optimal choice of strategic
trade policy in a third market model when information is incomplete across the duopoly exporters to
the third market.
Our principle results can be summarized as follows. In a choice of trade policy game„export subsidy
is a dominated strategy for country with incompletely informed firms. In other words, imposing direct
quantity control is always optimal for country with ill-informed firms irrespective of what form of
interventions is chosen by the other country. This holds for any degree of market uncertainty. For
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country with completely informed firms, the optimal choice of trade policy depends on the volatility of
market demand in the third market. If the market in the third country is relatively stable, imposing
export quota is optimal. Conversely, if market demand in the third country is relatively volatile,
subsidy turns out to be the optimal choice. This is driven by the option value effect associated with
better information.
Our analysis rests heavily on a number of simplifying assumptions. Firstly, the specification of
the demand structure is linear with an additive shock. A more general setting with respect to the
demand function could be introduced. Secondly, the source of uncertainty is unique in our theoretical
framework. We only consider the single source of uncertainty in market demand. In addition to country
specific shocks, one may introduce a richer environment of uncertainty by taking firm specific shocks
into consideration. Thirdly, we impose a common prior assumption on beliefs for all players involved.
Further research research could consider a more general setting by allowing different prior beliefs about
the states of nature. Lastly, we have assumed that consumers only reside in the third country. This
assumption is only appropriate if the good is produced solely for export or if the domestic market can
be isolated from trade policies by the use of consumption subsidies/taxes. This assumption simplifies
our analysis since consumer’s surplus is excluded from social welfare calculation. A more realistic
setting may include the domestic consumption of goods produced by the domestic firm.
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